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EXECUTING YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS: THE
UNANSWERED QUESTION IN EDDINGS v.
OKLAHOMA
I. Introduction
The juvenile justice system was created to "treat" 'and to "re-
habilitate" the juvenile offender.' The philosophy underlying this
approach is that the vulnerable nature of children makes the goals
of prosecution and punishment inappropriate.2 It was long believed
that because children could not formulate criminal intent 3 the state
1. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1966). The Court held that in a proceeding
which determines whether a juvenile should be transferred from juvenile to criminal
court, the juvenile has certain rights protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution, including the rights of representation by counsel, freedom from self-
incrimination, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses. For a discussion
of Gault, see infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
juvenile court system, see infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text. For expansive
treatments of the history of the juvenile justice system, see S. Cox & J. CONRAD,
JUVENILE JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO PRACTICE AND THEORY 72-94 (1978) (discussing
purpose and scope of juvenile court acts); L. EMPEY, JUVENILE JUSTICE, THE
PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND CURRENT REFORMS (1979) (collection of essays concerning
history of juvenile court system and its present changing system).
2. Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative
Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 516 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Unanswerable Questions]; see also T. JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION
TO THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 11-19 (1975).
On October 5, 1977, President James Carter signed the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights
Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35 (1978). Article six of the covenant on Civil and
Political Rights forbids the imposition of the death penalty on either pregnant
women or children under the age of eighteen. Id. at 72. In his message to the
Senate concerning these covenants, President Carter proposed a reservation to article
six which would reject the proposed restriction. President's Human Rights Treaty
Message to the Senate, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 396 (Feb. 23, 1978). By
reserving this right to execute juveniles and pregnant women, President Carter,
arguably, concluded that this right is consistent with the United States Constitution,
federal laws, and the constitutions of the individual states.
3. Frey, The Criminal Responsibility of the Juvenile Murderer, 1970 WASH.
U.L.Q. 113. At common law three presumptions existed as to the liability of a
minor. Id. A child under seven years of age was conclusively presumed to be
incapable of forming criminal intent and evidence could not be used to show such
intent. Id. A child between the ages of seven and fourteen was presumed incapable
of forming such intent but evidence was admissible to rebut this presumption. Id.
Finally, a child over fourteen was presumed capable of forming a mens rea and
responsible for his criminal acts and had the burden to show an absence of mens
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could not punish juvenile offenders as it could adult offenders who
were able to formulate such intent. Instead, the state's duty was to
rehabilitate juvenile offenders and to protect them from the social
conditions that lead to crime. 4
The existence of the juvenile court system does not immunize
children from criminal prosecution. Forty-eight states currently have
statutes that allow for or require the transfer of a juvenile offender
from a juvenile court to a county, city, or state criminal court.'
The effect of such a transfer is that the minor is removed from a
court system whose proceedings are characterized as non-criminal 6
and whose purpose is "treatment" and "rehabilitation" 7 to a court
which will investigate the culpability of the minor and possibly impose
a penal sanction. Thereafter, if the state has a death penalty and
the juvenile is alleged to have committed a capital offense, it is possible
that the juvenile will receive the death penalty.
287 of the known 14,029 criminals executed in American history
have been juveniles under the age of eighteen.' On May 1, 1982,
rea. Id.; see also P. BEAN, PUNISHMENT 111-12 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PUN-
ISHMENT]; Note, Problem of Age and Jurisdiction in the Juvenile Court, 19 VAND.
L. REV. 833, 835 (1966); infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
4. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Func-
tion and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 10 [hereinafter cited as Juvenile Court and
the Adversary System].
5. Unanswerable Questions, supra note 2, at 516 n.5. For an expansive treatment
of the transfer proceeding, see generally S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES-THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2d ed. 1984).
6. See T. JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 79 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as JUVENILE INTRODUCTION].
7. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
8. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience with Capital
Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REV.
613, 618-19 (1983). This computation was a joint effort between Professor Streib
and Watt Espy of the Capital Punishment Research Project of the University of
Alabama School of Law. The case files were examined by Professor Streib in order
to determine what percentage involved juveniles.
By contrasting the number of juveniles who commit murder to the percentage
of juveniles who are put to death, one can see the reluctance of society to impose
capital punishment on minors. In 1983, 19,308 murders were committed, or one
murder every twenty-seven minutes. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1984) [hereinafter cited as U.C.R.
for Uniform Crime Reports]. Of those persons convicted of murder in 1983, 41°06
were under twenty-five years of age while 707o were under age seventeen. Id. Thirty-
four percent of those convicted were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
four. Id. The following table illustrates juvenile involvement in other violent crimes
throughout the United States as tabulated from the voluntary reporting of local
and state police departments.
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seventeen of the 794 people on death row9 were under the age of
eighteen.' 0 In Eddings v. Oklahoma," the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari for consideration of whether the eighth
amendment 2 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on ju-
veniles.' 3 However, the Court did not consider the constitutional
question and, instead, remanded the case for consideration of an
"eleventh hour" claim submitted by the petitioner concerning the
failure of the state court to consider mitigating evidence before it
passed sentence. '4 As a result of Eddings, state laws concerning
juvenile capital punishment continue to operate subject to state
judicial interpretation of the eighth amendment."
Total of Those Arrested
Crime Total Occurrences %under 25 %under 21 % under 18
Robbery 500,221 68 48 26
Burglary 3,120,842 75 N/A 28
Larceny Theft 6,707,020 N/A 48 32
Car Theft 1,004,372 N/A 55 35
Arson 19,800 62 N/A 38
Forcible Rape 78,918 50 25076 were between ages 18 & 22
Table compiled by author from Uniform Crime Reports. N/A means that the
numbers for this age group were not available. See U.C.R., supra, at 13, 19, 26,
30, 35, and 39.
9. For purposes of this Note, the term "death row" refers to that part of a
prison set aside for those who have been sentenced to death and are awaiting
execution.
10. Brief for the Petitioner at 55, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
11. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
12. The eighth amendment provides: "[E]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
13. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 120 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For purposes of this
Note, "eleventh hour" refers to an issue originally raised in petitioner's brief and
not in the petition for certiorari.
14. Id. at 117. The question submitted by the petitioner was "[w]hether the
Court should address the plain error committed by the trial court when it refused
to consider the relevant mitigating evidence in violation of Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978)." Brief for petitioner at 1, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982). The Lockett Court held that a sentencer in a capital case must give full
consideration to all mitigating factors. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978).
For a discussion of Lockett, see infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. The
Eddings Court remanded the case for a consideration of all mitigating factors,
thereby answering the petitioner's questions affirmatively. For a discussion of
Eddings, see infra notes ,182-98 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 133-48 and accompanying text.
19851
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
This Note examines the theories of punishment underlying the
death penalty, briefly discusses the creation of the juvenile court
system and the mechanism of juvenile transfer." This Note then
discusses the development of the death penalty by examining Supreme
Court cases which have considered state laws challenged under the
eighth amendment as forms of cruel and unusual punishment. 7
Supreme Court decisions which have extended constitutional guar-
antees to minors in the areas of criminal prosecutions and privacy
rights also will be examined."8 The decision of the Court in Eddings
v. Oklahoma' will then be analyzed as will the conflicting state
and federal decisions and capital punishment statutes.20 Finally, this
Note proposes a model amendment to existing death penalty statutes
which prohibits capital punishment of juveniles.2
II. Threshold Considerations: Punishment, The Juvenile Court
System and Transfer
A. Theories of Punishment: Deterrence and Retribution
Sentencing in criminal court is based on four theories of punish-
ment: retribution, deterrence, restraint and rehabilitation. 2  The verb
"deter" means to "discourage, or prevent from acting by fear or
consideration of dangerous, difficult, or unpleasant attendant cir-
cumstances or consequences. ' 23 Therefore, deterrence, as a philos-
ophy in penal sentencing, is that restraint which fear of criminal
prosecution imposes on those likely to commit crimes. 24 This theory
16. See infra notes 22-59 and accompanying text. For purposes of this Note,
"transfer" refers to the change of jurisdiction over a juvenile to criminal court
from juvenile court.
17. See infra notes 60-104 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 105-32 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 133-250 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
22. S. GRUPP, THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 5 (1971). Since the imposition of the
death penalty would negate any application of the rehabilitation theory, this section
will restrict its analysis to deterrence and retribution. Rehabilitation will be discussed
in its capacity as a theory underlying the juvenile court system.
The restraint theory holds that the offender is dangerous to society and, therefore,
should be removed from the community. R. GERBER & P. MCANANY, CONTEMPORARY
PUNISHMENT: VIEws, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 129 (1972). Because this
Note is not precluding the possibility of imprisonment for juvenile offenders, restraint
will not be discussed as an applicable theory.
23. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 616 (3d ed. 1976).
24. J. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE 2 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as GIBBS]. Several authors recognize that the theory of deterrence is extremely
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assumes that people know the law and the consequences of violating
it and can conform their behavior to the norm. 25 Therefore, deterrence
emphasizes the knowledge of the person who committed the act and
the voluntary nature of the act rather than its severity.
Retribution demands the punishment of the transgressor because
society's sense of justice demands it.26 The goal of retribution
is to vindicate the rights of society whose sense of security has been
disturbed.27 However, since it is logical to conclude that society
would want only to punish those who willingly and knowingly offend
the public, the offender must act with a mens rea.8
That an offender is a juvenile at the time of his offense may
make punishment based on the theories of deterrence or retribution
ineffective. The deterrence theory assumes knowledge of the law and
the ability to conform behavior in accordance with that knowledge.
29
However, research has shown that children learn most of their
behavior through mere imitation of other's actions3 0 Moreover,
complex and such a simplistic definition does not fully explain all of its ramifications.
For discussions of this point, see GIBBS supra at 29; PUNISHMENT, supra note
3, at 29; Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing, and
Habituative Effects, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 550.
Deterrence has been broken down by one group of authors into two categories:
special deterrence and general deterrence. S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER, & M. PAULSEN,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES-CASES AND MATERIALS 195-96 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as CRIMINAL LAW]. General deterrence is the threat of punishment which acts
to restrain all potential offenders. Id. Special deterrence acts to inflict punishment
on convicted defendants so as to restrain them from future criminal conduct. Id.
For purposes of this Note, deterrence will be explored as a single, general concept.
25. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF- CANADA, FEAR OF PUNISHMENT: DETERRENCE
10-12 (1976). The Commission notes that there are eight assumptions which underlie
the theory of deterrence:
1. Man is a rational being; 2. man is a hedonistic being, attracted by
pleasure and repelled by pain; 3. man is free to choose; 4. men know
in every case what is harmful to them; 5. man is able to control his
behavior; 6. man learns from his own experience and from the experience
of others; 7. man can be deterred by fear; 8. men are knowledgable of
laws and sanctions.
Id.
26. F. FASUST & P. BRANTINGHAM, JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY 7 (1974).
The authors identify three basic requirements for the effective use of criminal
punishment based on the retribution theory: 1. criminal acts must be voluntary
and morally wrong; 2. punishment must fit the offense; and 3. punishment must
represent a return of suffering to the wrongdoer for his morally wrong act. Id.
27. Mueller, Punishment, Corrections and the Law, 45 NEB. L. REv. 58, 68
(1966).
28. Mens rea is defined as "blameworthiness entailed in choosing to commit
a criminal wrong." CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 24, at 267.
29. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
30. E. HETHERINGTON & R. PARKE, CHILD PSYCHOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY VIEW-
POINT 147 (1975).
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positive reinforcement is not necessary for these new responses to
repeat themselves. 3
In one study, children watched an adult pummel, hit and kick a
large inflated doll.12 When left alone with the doll, the children
exhibited behavior which matched that of the adult.33 Clearly, learning
had taken place.34 Although the children imitated the adult, they
were unaware of the violent nature of their activity." Arguably, a
child may not be able to comprehend that the violent acts they
commit could result in the death of a living person.3 6 Therefore,
the minor's knowledge of the penal sanctions for murder, would
not deter him. Since a minor may be unable to conform his behavior
to the law, capital punishment of juveniles is not justified by the
deterrence theory.37
A minor's lack of knowledge as to the nature of his actions also
might negate the formation of the criminal intent necessary for the
successful use of the retribution theory. By punishing a youthful
offender, society punishes not a willful transgressor but only an
immature and inexperienced one thus rendering retribution unde-
sirable.38
B. The Development of the Juvenile Court System
On July 1, 1899, the first juvenile court was established in Cook
County Chicago by a law entitled "An Act to Regulate the Treatment
and Control of Dependent, Neglected, and Delinquent Children." 3 9
31. Id. at 148.
32. Id. While the doll was being attacked, the attacker was neither praised nor
punished for his actions. Therefore, no consequences of punishment or reward were
attributed to the adult, so that the child was not reinforced. Id.
33. Id. Many of the model's verbal and motor responses were purposely bizarre
and novel, unlike anything that the children in the study had ever seen before,
much less performed. Id.
34. Id. The researchers concluded that the reproduction by the children of novel
violent behavior clearly showed that learning had taken place. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also J. DOUGLAS & F. WAKSLER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE:
AN INTRODUCTION 262 (1982). The authors note the importance of looking to the
intent of an actor who performed a violent act before determining a proper and
just punishment. Id.
37. L. EMPEY, AMERICAN DELIQUENCY-ITS MEANING AND CONSTRUCTION 516
(1982).
38. Id.
39. S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (1984); L.
SIEGAL & J. SENNA, JUVENILE DELIQUENCY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 310-13
(1981) [hereinafter cited as JUVENILE DELIQUENCY]; JUVENILE INTRODUCTION, supra
note 6, at 3.
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By 1917, all but three states had enacted statutes mandating the use
of separate court systems for minors.4 ° Presently, there are more
than 3000 juvenile courts and approximately 1000 juvenile correc-
tional facilities throughout the United States. 4'
The primary concern of those who established the juvenile court
system was that the social conditions of the age, such as the wide-
spread poverty resulting from industrialization and rapid urbani-
zation, had forced the juvenile population to geographic areas prone
The Act established a separate court for delinquent, dependent, and neglected
children under the age of sixteen. See JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra, at 313. It
also established special legal procedures to govern the adjudication and disposition
of juvenile matters. Id. For example, it gave the court authority to appoint probation
officers who would investigate the case and represent the child when the case was
heard. Schultz, The Cycle of Juvenile Court History, 19 CRIME AND DELINQ. 457,
458 (1973) [hereinafter cited as The Cycle]. The Act also mandated that children
should be separated from adults whenever they were confined in the same institution.
Id. Finally, the Act stated in its concluding paragraph that its purpose was to
approximate closely the care that minors would receive from their parents. Id.
40. See Juvenile Court and the Adversary System, supra note 4, at 10. New
York was one of the three states which resisted the juvenile court movement. Note,
Post-Conviction Proceedings Under New York's Juvenile Offender Laws: A Due
Process Critique, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 773, 778 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Post-Conviction Proceedings]. The other two states were Maine and Wyoming.
Whisenand & McLaughlin, Completing the Cycle: Reality and the Juvenile Justice
System in New York State, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1, 10 n.32 (1982). New York, however,
adopted a juvenile court system similar to those in other states with the passage
of the Children's Court Act. See Post-Conviction Proceedings, supra, at 781; see
also 1922 N.Y. Laws ch. 547, § 3. The notion that the purpose of the juvenile
court system was to provide rehabilitative treatment was not affirmed judicially in
New York until 1932. See People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 176, 183 N.E. 353,
354 (1932). In Lewis, the New York Court of Appeals held that it was the State's
obligation to aid the child and not impose criminal sanctions. Id. This view remained
unchanged in New York until 1962. See Post-Conviction Proceedings, supra, at
781.
In 1962, New York enacted The Family Court Act. 1962 N.Y. Laws, ch. 686,
§ 115. The Act gave the family court jurisdiction over juvenile delinquents, persons
in need of supervision, and neglected children. Id. It was believed that the family
court could best consider the interests of the child, Woods, New York's Juvenile
Offender Law: An Overview and Analysis, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 18 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Juvenile Offender Law]. Under the Act, a juvenile arrested
for a crime either was released by the police to his parents or brought directly to
the family court. Id. If the prosecutor decided to file a petition against the juvenile,
the juvenile is brought before a family court judge who can either grant parole
or remand for detention. Id.
The role of the family court judge was altered significantly by the passage of
the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976. See Juvenile Offender Law, supra note
3, at 16; see also 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 878. The Act specifically requires the court
to consider the need for protection of the community as well as the needs of the
defendant. Id. However, the family court retained jurisdiction over the juvenile of-
fender. Id.
41. See JUVENILE DELIQUENCY, supra note 39, at 275.
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to criminal deviance and immorality.42 The child was considered by
reformers not as an enemy of society but rather as a ward who
needed to be protected from these social conditions. 3 The objectives
of the system, therefore, were to provide guidance and rehabilitation
for the child and protection for society, not to extend the concepts
of criminal responsibility, guilt, and punishment."
The legal concept of parens patriae,45 which was used to justify
this view, referred to the power of the state as sovereign to act as
guardian for those under a legal disability.46 The originators of the
juvenile court system expanded this concept to justify the estab-
lishment of a separate individualized court system for minors.47 The
juvenile court sought to provide services to promote the development
42. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187, 1191 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Juvenile Justice Reform]. The original juvenile
courts concentrated on aiding those who were vagrants or guilty of petty thefts
or other minor offenses, while major offenders were tried in the adult criminal
system. Id. Therefore, the major concern of the juvenile justice system was not
with non-reformable major offenders, but was with those who engaged in less
serious antisocial conduct. Id. at 1191-92.
43. This is illustrated by the wording of the Illinois act:
This act shall be liberally construed, to the end that its purpose may
be carried out, to wit: That the care, custody, and discipline of the child
shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by
its parents, and in all cases where it can properly be done, the child be
placed in an improved family home and become a member of the family
by legal adoption or otherwise.
The Cycle, supra note 39, at 458.
44. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966). In Kent, the juvenile
court waived jurisdiction over the appellant and transferred him to criminal court.
Id. at 546. Kent attacked the criminal conviction by alleging errors in the waiver
proceeding. Id. at 551. In reversing the appellant's conviction, the Supreme Court
held that the transfer proceeding was a critically important action in determining
the adjudication of a minor and, therefore, must comply with the basic requirements
of due process and fairness. Id. at 553. The Court concluded that Kent had the
right to a hearing, assistance of counsel, and a statement of the reasons for transfer.
Id. at 554.
45. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16; Kent, 383 U.S. at 555. See generally R. VINTER
& R. SARRI, BROUGHT TO JUSTICE? JUVENILES, THE COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as BROUGHT TO JUSTICE]; Note, Misapplication of the Parens
Patriae Power in Deliquency Proceedings, 29 IND. L.J. 475 (1954) (argues that in
deliquency hearings proof of parental deficiency must be shown before juvenile
sent to institution); Note, The Parens Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the Con-
stitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 894 (1966) (examines
historical development of parens patriae doctrine).
46. R. & J. TROJANOWICZ, JUVENILE DELIQUENCY, CONCEPTS AND CONTROL 24
(2d ed. 1978); Reasons, Gault: Procedural Change and Substantive Effect, 16
CRIME AND DELINQ. 163, 164 n.3 (1970); see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th
ed. 1979).
47. See Juvenile Justice Reform, supra note 42, at 1192-93.
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of those who came before it and not to impose penal sanctions. 41
Since its inception, the juvenile court has been designated as non-
criminal in nature. 49
C. Transfer From Juvenile Court to Criminal Court
The protections of the juvenile court are not extended to all minors
charged with violating the law. Minors who commit serious offenses
are subject to trial as adult defendants in the criminal court under
certain circumstances. Forty-eight states provide some statutory
mechanism50 to prosecute juveniles in adult criminal proceedings. 1
48. Id. at 1192-93; see BROUGHT TO JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 3.
49. See JUVENILE DELIQUENCY, supra note 39, at 280-81. The authors note that
the different terminology used in juvenile court as compared with the criminal
court also illustrates the noncriminal nature of the juvenile court. Id. A youth
does not go to "trial" in juvenile court; he goes to a hearing where his case is
then adjudicated. Id. Instead of pleading guilty, a youthful offender agrees to a
finding or, if the youth wants to assert his innocence, the youth denies the petition.
Id. The minor is thereafter detained in a detention facility or a child care shelter,
not a jail. Id. Finally, the offender is not sentenced, but a plan of rehabilitative
treatment is designed. Id.
50. The mechanism for transferring jurisdiction over a youthful offender from
juvenile to criminal court is known by a variety of terms. These include "reference,"
"certification for adult prosecution," ''waiver,' ''decline," and "transfer of juvenile
court jurisdiction." Unanswerable Questions, supra note 2, at 516 n.5.
51. ALA. CODE § 12-15-34 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1982); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 8-202 (West Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-417 (Supp. 1983); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-108 (1973);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-122 (West 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 938 (Supp.
1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(5) (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-39 (1982);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-22 (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 16-1806 (Supp. 1984);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7 (Supp. 1985); IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4 (Supp. 1984);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.72 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (1981);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1571.1 (West 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
3101(4) (West Supp. 1985); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-817 (1984);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 61 (West Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 764.27 (West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125 (West 1982); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 43-21-157 (Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071 (Vernon Supp. 1985); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-5-204 to -206 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-247 (1984); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 62.060-.080 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:21 (1977); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-26 (West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. . 32-1-29 (1978):
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.75 (McKinney 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-524
(1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26
(Page Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112 (West Supp. 1985); OR.
REV. STAT. § 419.533 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-430 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-11-1
(1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 54:02 (1975); TEX. FAMILY CODE § 54.02 (Vernon
1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-25 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 635A (1981);
VA. CODE §§ 16.1-269 to -270 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.060 (West Supp.
1985); W. VA; CODE § 49-5-10 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.18 (West Supp. 1984);
WYo. STAT. § 14-6-203 (Supp. 1984).
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The procedure for the transfer of juvenile defendants varies among
these states.5 2 Generally, however, the procedure includes a hearing
in which such factors as the age of the defendant, the nature of
the crime committed, and the defendant's past history are investi-
gated. 3 The juvenile court judge then transfers the defendant to
criminal court if he determines that the defendant is not amenable
The District of Columbia and the federal government both provide for transfer.
See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307 (1981); 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1983).
Both Kentucky and Pennsylvania had such a mechanism but have repealed them.
See Ky. REV. STAT. § 208.170 (Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325
(Purdon Supp. 1984).
52. For example, Oklahoma treats a juvenile offender under the age of sixteen
differently than it does older children. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1104-1112(B)
(West Supp. 1985). If a person is age sixteen or seventeen, the court, before
transferring a juvenile, will consider in what manner the offense was committed,
whether it was against a person or property, the past record of the juvenile, and
the prospect for adequate protection of the public if the accused proceeds through
the juvenile justice system. Id. § 1112.
Other states do not make this sort of age differentiation. Both Connecticut and
Maine provide that a child of any age can be transferred from the juvenile court
system if he committed a serious felony such as murder, armed robbery, or
kidnapping. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-126 (West 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 3101 (West Supp. 1985). However, in deciding whether to transfer the
juvenile, these states will use criteria similar to those employed by Oklahoma. Id.
In contrast, the state of Alabama will not allow a child to be transferred unless
he was age fourteen at the time of the offense. ALA. CODE § 12-15-34 (1977).
53. See supra note 51. New York's system differs from those of most other
states. If a defendant is fourteen or fifteen and is alleged to have committed any
of the fourteen crimes (including second degree murder), or a thirteen-year-old
who is criminally responsible for acts constituting second degree murder, that
defendant is classified as a juvenile offender. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(18)
(McKinney Supp. 1984). Once arrested, the juvenile is treated as an adult and his
case is screened by an assistant district attorney. See Juvenile Offender Law, supra
note 40, at 25. If the attorney decides that the crime does not fall under the
Juvenile Offender Act, he can decline to prosecute. Id. at 25. However, if he
chooses to prosecute, the juvenile is arraigned in criminal court as an adult. Id.
at 26.
The criminal court judge can order removal of the defendant to the family court
by request of the district attorney in certain circumstances. First, the judge can
order removal if he determines that removal is in the best interests of justice. N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.75(4) (McKinney 1982). However, if the juvenile is charged
with murder, rape, sodomy, or an armed felony (i.e. armed robbery), the order
to remove must be based upon a finding of one or more of the following factors:
(i) mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which
the crime was committed; or (ii) where the defendant was not the sole
participant in the crime, the defendant's participation was relatively minor
although not so minor as to constitute a defense to the prosecution; or
(iii) possible deficiencies in proof of the crime.
Id.
If the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the juvenile, there are two additional
possible ways in which the juvenile may be removed from the criminal court based
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to rehabilitative treatment . 4 Some states provide for automatic trans-
fer if the juvenile commits a certain type of crime." The transfer
determination generally is binding on the criminal trial court. 6
As a result of the transfer proceeding from juvenile to criminal
court, the minor is held to the same standard of guilt57 and is
susceptible to the same punishment as an adult.5" Once transfer has
been completed, the defendant's special status as a juvenile is lostA9
Therefore, despite their minority, juveniles are treated as mature
and held to an adult standard of behavior.
II. Supreme Court Precedents
A. The Death Penalty
The primary focus of courts examining claims of violations of
the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment 6° has been on the method or kind of punishment imposed
for violation of criminal statutes. 61 The social policy underlying the
on the result of the criminal court trial. If the jury convicts a juvenile on a lesser
included offense, the criminal court must order the verdict vacated and replaced
by a juvenile delinquency fact determination. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.85(3)
(McKinney 1982). If a jury verdict is vacated by the judge, the court must remove
the proceeding to family court. Id. § 310.85(2). Additionally, if the juvenile is
convicted of the crime for which he was indicted and the crime is one other than
second degree murder, the action may be removed upon a motion by the juvenile
and with the consent of the district attorney. Id. § 330.25(1); see N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.05 (McKinney Supp. 1984) (sanctions criminal court may impose upon youthful
offender if it retains jurisdiction).
It has been suggested that New York consider changing the jurisdictional transfer
system of youthful offenders so that the Family Court would again have exclusive
jurisdiction. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1985, at A23, col. 1.
54. Note, Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts: A Policy
Statement, 8 CRIME AND DELINQ. 3, 6 (1962).
55. See supra note 52.
56. Waiver determinations must be appealed to the juvenile court. Mountford
& Berenson, Waiver of Jurisdiction: The Last Resort of the Juvenile Court, 18
U. KAN. L. REV. 55, 67 (1969). Therefore, the question of the propriety of the
waiver conclusion is not a proper question for the criminal court and the deter-
mination is binding on that court.
57. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 556-57.
58. Alers, Transfer of Jurisdiction from Juvenile to Criminal Court, 19 CRIME
AND DELINQ. 519, 522 (1973).
59. Id.
60. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1976). The Court in
Ingraham considered the propriety of a Florida statute which authorized corporal
punishment in school after the teacher had consulted with the principal. Id. at
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amendment's protection is nothing less than the "dignities of man. ' 62
The Supreme Court, in Trop v. Dulles,63 stated that the eighth
amendment draws its meaning from "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 6 Therefore,
a court must consider society's standards and determine society's
willingness to accept the statute and the punishment it permits when
construing a capital punishment statute in light of the eighth amend-
ment.
In Furman v. Georgia,65 the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion,
held that the state's death penalty violated the eighth and fourteenth
amendments in each of the three specific cases.66 One case involved
655. The statute was challenged on the ground that it prescribed a cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Id. at 659. The Court rejected
this claim by holding that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment only applies to criminal prosecution. Id. at 667.
See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1967) (plurality opinion). Appellant-
petitioner Powell was arrested and charged with violating a state public intoxication
law and fined fifty dollars. Id. at 517. Appellant argued that he was a chronic
alcoholic and that the state was violating the eighth amendment by punishing him
merely for his status. Id. at 532. The Court rejected the eighth amendment claim
and concluded that Texas had the right to impose a criminal sanction on one
whose public behavior may create a substantial health or safety hazard. Id.; see
also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 916 (1978). In Weems, the Court considered the constitu-
tionality of section 56 of the Penal Code of the Phillipine Islands which prescribed
fifteen years of hard labor as the punishment for falsifying public documents. 217
U.S. at 362. The Court held that the statute violated the eighth amendment and
reasoned that the confinement prescribed-at least twelve years in which the offender
was chained at the ankle and the waist, forced to undertake hard and painful
labor, and permitted no contact with any family and friends-coupled with the
psychological impact of such an ordeal created a punishment disproportionate to
the crime committed. Id. at 363-67.
62. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). Petitioner, a native born American,
lost his United States citizenship by reason of his conviction by court martial for
wartime activity. Id. at 87. The Court concluded that such a punishment was
violative of the eighth amendment because loss of citizenship stripped an individual
of his status in society and was disproportionate to the offense the defendant
committed. Id. at 101.
63. Id. at 86.
64. Id. at 101.
65. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
66. Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Court subsequently held that when
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, then the holding of the Court is that position
taken by those members who concurred on the narrowest grounds. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976). The Court then stated that its holding in Furman
was that position taken by Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White. Id. Justices
Stewart's and White's position rested on the conclusion that "the Eighth and
Fourteenth ammendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under
legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly
imposed." 408 U.S. at 310.
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a murder conviction,67 and the other two cases were rape convic-
tions.61 In all three instances, the determination as to whether the
death penalty should be imposed had been left to the discretion of
the jury.69 The Court concluded that, in giving the jury complete and
unguided sentencing authority in these three cases, the statute allowed
for sentences which were "wantonly and freakishly" imposed by the
state court.70 However, in restricting its opinion to the three cases,
the Court effectively withheld judgment on whether capital punish-
ment was unconstitutional for all crimes and in all circumstances or
whether any state capital punishment system was unconstitutional.
These questions were answered in Gregg v. Georgia,' where
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia statute
which prescribed a bifurcated trial to separately consider a defend-
ant's guilt and, upon a finding that the defendant was guilty, to
determine what constituted a just sentence. 2 The statute also pro-
vided that one of ten aggravating circumstances listed in the statute
had to be found for death to be imposed."3 These aggravating
circumstances included a defendant's prior criminal convictions,
whether the murder, rape, armed robbery or kidnapping was com-
mitted while the defendant was engaged in a buglary or arson,
whether the defendant endangered more than one person, and whether
the deceased was a peace officer. 74
67. Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969) (court upheld death
penalty where defendant guilty of shooting decedent-homeowner during burglary).
68. Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 790, 794, 171 S.E.2d 501, 504 (1969) (petitioner,
an escaped convict, sentenced to death for rape); Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d
932, 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (petitioner sentenced to death for breaking into
victim's home, raping her, and then stealing her money).
69. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring). In all three cases the
death penalty was imposed.
70. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart reasoned that the
sentencing procedure was imposed discriminatorily because large numbers of rapes
had occurred in 1967 and 1968 while the death penalty was imposed on only a
small fraction of the rapists. See also Note, Discrimination and Arbitrariness in
Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Post-Furman Murder Cases in Dade County,
Florida 1973-1976, 33 STAN. L. REV. 75, 77-78 (1980).
71. 428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
72. Id. at 169. Petitioner Gregg was sentenced to death under the statute after
he was convicted of robbing and murdering two people who had stopped to give
him a ride.
73. Id. at 164.
74. Id. at 165-66 n.9. The statute provided:
(a) The death penalty may be imposed for the offenses of aircraft hijacking
or treason, in any case.
(b) In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be
authorized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions
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The Georgia statute also required consideration of factors that
could mitigate a sentence from death to life imprisonment." However,
the scope of the mitigating factors was not detailed by the statute,
leaving the judge or jury to consider "any factor they deemed relevant
to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating
circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following
statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evi-
dence:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital
felony, or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has
a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another
capital felony, or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary
or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping
knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a
public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be
hazardous to the lives of more than one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another,
for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district
attorney or solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or
because of the exercise of his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or com-
mitted murder as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer,
corrections employee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of
his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has
escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful
confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering
with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful
confinement, of himself or another.
(c) The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be
warranted by the evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to
the jury for its deliberation. The jury, if its verdict be a recommendation
of death, shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury,
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a
reasonable doubt. In non-jury cases the judge shall make such designation.
Except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of
the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in section 27-2534.1
(b) is so found, the death penalty shall not be imposed.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975). The current Georgia statute is unchanged.
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1984).
75. 428 U.S. at 164.
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to mitigation."7 6 Finally, the statute required an expedited direct
review by the Supreme Court of Georgia for a determination whether
the death penalty was imposed appropriately." The Supreme Court
concluded that the concerns it expressed in Furman,"8 that a death
penalty not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner, had
been fulfilled by the Georgia statute.7 9
In Gregg, the Supreme Court concluded that an eighth amendment
analysis of a challenged capital punishment statute involved an as-
sessment of contemporary values concerning the application of a
criminal sentencing statute.80 The Court stated that the jury was a
significant and reliable objective index of these values because it
was so directly involved in sentencing procedures.' Therefore, to
ascertain whether imposition of capital punishment is proper, a state
or federal court must look to society's values and to sentencing
decisions made by juries.
While the Georgia death penalty statute satisfied constitutional
requirements, not all post-Furman statutes have been able to do so.
In Woodson v. North Carolina12 and Roberts v. Louisiana,3 the
76. Id.
77. Id. at 166. this provision is still a part'of the Georgia death penalty. GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(c) (1984). In looking to the sentence the court must determine:
1. Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and 2. Whether, in
cases other than treason or aircraft hijacking, the evidence supports the
jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as
enumerated in section 27.2534.1(b) and, 3. Whether the sentence of death
is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed, in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.
428 U.S. at 166-67.
78. 408 U.S 238; see also supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
79. 428 U.S. at 198. Justice Stewart's plurality opinion was supported by Justices
Powell and Stevens. Id. at 158. Justice White's opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 226-27. For a discussion of the significance
of a plurality decision, see supra note 66.
80. Id. at 181-82. Although the Court did not state as such, it seems logical
to conclude that such an examination of social values may necessitate the need to
use statistics. For a discussion of the propriety of the use of such statistics in a
capital case, see Nat'l L.J., Dec. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 4.
81. 428 U.S. at 181. There were two dissenters in Gregg, Justices Brennan and
Marshall. Justice Brennan concluded that the death penalty treated members of
society as "nonhumans" and that its exercise is inconsistent with the guarantees
of the eighth amendment of civilized treatment to all citizens. Id. at 230 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall concluded that the death penalty did not further
the goals of retribution or deterrence and was, therefore, an excessive punishment.
Id. at 241 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Petitioners were convicted of first degree murder as
the result of their participation in an armed robbery in which one person was
killed. Id. at 282-83. Woodson was a lookout in the escape vehicle during the rob-
bery. Id. at 283.
83. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder for
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Court struck down two statutes which prescribed the death penalty
as mandatory punishment for two defendants who had been convicted
of murder in the first degree.84 The Court concluded that, in both
instances, the statutes were unconstitutional because they did not
allow for a consideration of the particular offense or the character
and propensities of the defendant.85 The Court also concluded that the
statutes failed to provide the juries with an adequate guide as to
which criminal should receive a death sentence.16 In Woodson, the
Court reiterated that the eighth amendment requires a court con-
sidering the death penalty to look to indicia of society's values
such as history and prior usage of the statute, legislative enactments,
and jury determination.87
The importance of full consideration of all mitigating factors was
detailed by the Court in Lockett v. Ohio.8" In Lockett, a pawn-
broker was fatally shot during a robbery while the petitioner
remained in the getaway car.89 Subsequently, Lockett was found
shooting a gas station attendant in the course of a robbery. Id. at 327-28.
84. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336. The North Carolina
statute prescribed death as the mandatory punishment for first degree murder.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286. The Louisiana statute prescribed death as mandatory
punishment for all persons found guilty of first degree murder, aggravated rape,
aggravated kidnapping, or treason. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331. However, the two
statutes differed in that the crime of first degree murder in North Carolina included
any willful, deliberate, or premeditated homicide and felony murder while the
Louisiana statute was limited to the following five categories of homicide: where
homicide was committed during certain felonies; where the victim was a fireman
or peace officer performing his duties; where the killer's motive was remuneration;
where there was intent to harm more than one person; or where the killer has a
prior murder conviction or is under a current life sentence. Id. at 331-32.
85. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304-05; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333. In Woodson, the
Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it did not give significance
to the relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or
the circumstances of the offense. 428 U.S. at 304-05. In Roberts, the Court reiterated
the need to focus on the circumstances of the particular offense and the character
and propensities of the offender. 428 U.S. at 333-34.
86. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-03; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334-35. In Woodson,
the Court showed concern over the fact that American juries had refused to convict
a significant portion of persons charged with first-degree murder of that offense
under mandatory death penalty statutes. 428 U.S. at 302. In Roberts, the Court
stated that a sentencing system based on inflexible standards which failed to consider
mitigating factors invites jurors to choose a verdict for a lesser offense if they
feel that the death penalty is inappropriate. Consequently, individuals are convicted
for crimes which were different from those that they actually committed. Roberts,
428 U.S. at 334-35.
87. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 288.
88. 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978).
89. Id. at 590. Lockett also helped plan the robbery and hid the two gunmen
afterwards. Id. at 589-91.
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guilty of aggravated murder, for which the death penalty was an
appropriate punishment.9" Under Ohio law, the judge was required
to impose the death penalty unless he found that one of the three
statutory mitigating factors existed.9" In concluding that none of the
three factors were present in Lockett's case, the trial judge imposed
the death sentence. 92
The Supreme Court struck down the Ohio death penalty statute
because it prevented the sentencer in a capital case from giving
consideration to independent mitigating factors relating to the de-
fendant's character and past history and to the circumstances sur-
rounding the actual offense. 93 The Court concluded that limiting the
range of mitigating factors is incompatible with Furman and that
a death penalty statute must consider any factor relevant to mitigation
to meet constitutional requirements. 94
Recently, the Supreme Court took a major step in the develop-
ment of the death penalty when it decided that capital punish-
ment is never constitutional for certain types of crimes. In de-
termining whether the death penalty was an appropriate punishment
for rape, the Court, in Coker v. Georgia,95 looked to the number
of states which imposed such a punishment 96 and the propensity of
juries to impose the death penalty on convicted rapists. 97 The Court,
noting that recent cases gave rise to the need for this analysis, 98
90. Id. at 593.
91. Id. The trial judge was required by state law to consider the nature of the
offense and the defendant's "history, character, and condition" and then determine
whether "1. the victim had induced or facilitated the offense, 2. it was unlikely
that Lockett, would have committed the offense but for the fact that she 'was under
duress, coercion, or strong provocation,' or 3. the offense was 'primarily the product
of [Lockett's] psychosis or mental deficiency.' " Id.
92. Id. at 594. The trial judge noted that the offense was not the product of
a psychosis or mental deficiency, but he did not specifically mention the other two
factors.
93. Id. at 605 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
94. Id. at 608 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
95. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Petitioner Coker broke into the home of Allen and
Elnita Carver. He tied up Mr. Carver and raped Mrs. Carver. He then drove away in
their car, taking Mrs. Carver with him. She was later rescued by the police. Id. at 587.
96. Id. at 593. The Court observed that at no time in the past had a majority
of states authorized death as a punishment for rape, Id. It also observed that those
states which had authorized such a punishment had their death penalties invalidated
by Furman. Id.
97. Id. at 596-97. The Court concluded that in nine out of ten cases juries had
not imposed the death penalty. Id. at 597.
98. Id. at 593. The Court does not specifically mention to which cases it is refer-
ring, but one must conclude that they are concerned with such cases as Furman,
Gregg, Woodson, and Roberts.
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recognized that while the attitude of state legislatures and sentencing
juries was an important indicator, it did not wholly determine the
controversy. 99 The Court stated that this evidence supported its
opinion that death was a disproportionate penalty for the crime of
rape and that the statute violated the eighth amendment.' °°
The limitations and requirements developed by the Supreme Court
since Furman make clear that a death penalty statute must consider
a sufficient number of aggravating factors' 0' as well as any factor that
the judge or jury deems relevant to mitigation to surpass eighth
amendment challenges.10 2 A state cannot mandate capital punishment
for a specific act. 03 While the appropriateness of considering the
defendant's age has never been squarely decided by the Court, it
has been referred to as a mitigating factor in several cases.10 4 Although
these cases demonstrate that a court must consider the age of the
offender before imposing the death penalty, it remains unclear whether
the eighth amendment might mandate a full immunity from capital
punishment for juveniles.
B. Constitutional Rights of Juveniles
The Supreme Court has recognized that minors share in the benefits
and protections of the Constitution.0 5 However, it also has held
that, due to the special nature of the role of the parents and the
99. Id. at 597.
100. Id. The dissenting opinion in Coker, written by Chief Justice Burger and
joined by Justice Rehnquist, essentially concluded that the issue decided by the
majority was one for the state legislatures. Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger reasoned that rape is a serious crime and, therefore, it is not
cruel and unusual punishment to impose death as a sanction. Id. The Georgia
legislature, therefore, properly could impose death as a sanction. Id. at 604-05
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
101. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197-98; see supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
102. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608; see supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
103. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336; see supra notes 88-
94 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 ("[tlhe sentencer . . . [must] not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's
character or record . . ."); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 ("[alre there any special facts
about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment [e.g., his
youth] . . .?"); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 273, quoting with approval, Jurek
v. Texas, 522 S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) ("[tlhe jury . . . could
further look to the age of the defendant . . .").
105. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). The Court reversed the conviction of
a minor for a crime which prescribes incarceration as its punishment due to the
failure of the juvenile court to provide written notice of the issues at trial to the
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family in the development and protection of juveniles, 0 6 constitu-
tional principles must be applied with sensitivity and flexibility in
matters concerning parents and children.10 7 Seemingly, the Supreme
Court's treatment of cases involving the rights of juveniles can be
divided into two categories: (1) constitutional expansion in which
minors' rights as citizens are expanded such that they are afforded
"adult" constitutional rights; and (2) constitutional protection in
which state restrictions are upheld and minors are protected by the
Court. The question, therefore, is whether juvenile death penalty
statutes belong in the category of protection or expansion.
In civil and criminal proceedings which threaten the loss of a
minor's liberty or property interests, the Supreme Court has con-
cluded that the child's constitutional rights are virtually identical to
those of an adult.' In In re Gault,0 9 the Court held that minors
parents or child, and its failure to inform the parents and child of the child's right
to counsel, as well as his privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 33, 41, 55.
The Court held that these procedural requirements were part of the due process
rights of the child, and stated that "neither the fourteenth amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone." Id. at 13. In his dissent, Justice Stewart reasoned
that a juvenile proceeding's purpose differs from that of the prosecution in a
criminal court. Id. at 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart criticizes the
majority in stating that they are attempting to change the juvenile proceeding into
a criminal prosecution. Id.
. 106. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(Powell, J., concurring). "Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects
the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition .... It is through the family that we
inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral, and cultural."
Id. At issue in Moore was an Ohio ordinance which limited occupancy of a dwelling
unit to members of a single nuclear family. Id. at 495-96. The Court struck down
the statute. Id. at 506.
107. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (Court invalidated Massachusetts statute which required parental consent
before abortion could be performed on unmarried woman under age of eighteen).
108. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (corporal punishment
of school children implicates constitutionally protected liberty interest); Breed v.
Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529-31 (1975) (fifth amendment double jeopardy clause prohibits
prosecuting minors as adults after adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that they
violated criminal statute); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (property interest
in educational benefits which student receives may not be taken away from student
without due process); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (conviction of minor
for adult crime reversed due to failure of state court to use "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard required by "the essentials of due process and fair treatment").
But see T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4087 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985) (school officials can
search students without warrant or probable cause if search is reasonable); McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-45 (1971) (children tried in juvenile court have
no right to trial by jury). For. an analysis of New Jersey v. T.L.O., see N.Y.
Times, Jan. 21, 1985, at B4, col. 4.
109. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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are entitled to adequate notice of the charges against them,' 10 the
assistance of counsel,' the privilege against self incrimination, 12
and the right to confront and cross examine witnesses when under
the jurisdiction of a non-juvenile criminal court."3 Minors also have
been given protection against double jeopardy" 4 and the protection
of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof in non-
juvenile criminal proceedings." 5
In concluding that these rights extend to minors, the Court stated
that juvenile criminal proceedings need not conform in all respects
with the requirements of an adult criminal trial." ' However, the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment" 7 requires ap-
plication of the essentials of "due process and fair treatment" in
110. Id. at 33-34. "[The Constitution] does not allow a hearing to be held in
which a youth's freedom and his parents' right to his custody are at stake without
giving them timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of the specific issues that
they must meet." Id.
111. Id. at 36 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)). "The child
'requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceeding against him.' " Id.
In Powell, the Court held that if, in a criminal case, the accused is unable to
obtain counsel, it is the duty of the trial court to appoint counsel for him. 287
U.S. at 73.
112. Gault, 387 U.S. at 55. The Court stated:
We conclude that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is
applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults. We
appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the
privilege by or on behalf of children, and that there will be some
differences in technique-but not in principle-depending upon the age
of the child and the presence and competence of parents.
Id.
113. Id. at 57. "We now hold that, absent a valid confession, a determination
of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained
in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination
in accordance with our law and constitutional requirements." Id.
114. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975). The respondent was tried initially
in juvenile court where it was determined that he violated a criminal statute and
that he was unfit for treatment as a juvenile. Id. at 520. It was ordered that he
be prosecuted as an adult, and subsequently was convicted of robbery by the
Superior Court of California. Id. at 524-25.
115. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). Section 744(B) of the New York
Family Court Act provided that "[any determination at the conclusion of [an
adjudicatory] hearing that a [juvenile] did an act or acts must be based on a
preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 360. The appellant was found guilty under
this statute of an act which if done by an adult would have constituted larcency.
Id. at 368. The Court struck down this statute by holding that the standard of
proof in such a proceeding must be that beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 368.
The Court reasoned that the due process clause required application during the
juvenile hearing of the essentials of due process and fair treatment. Id. at 365-66.
116. Kent, 383 U.S. at 562.
117. U.S. CoNSr. amend. XIV, § 1. The amendment provides that "[njo state
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juvenile criminal proceedings." 8 By granting juveniles only specific
constitutional guarantees, the Court can preserve the juvenile justice
system distinct from that of the adult system and still safeguard the
vulnerability of children." 9
The constitutional right to privacy120 also has been recently extended
to minors.' 2' The Court has reasoned that constitutional rights do
attach not only when one reaches the age of majority but also are
present during minority.12  Therefore, minors have the right to seek
shall . . . abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law ... ." Id.
118. Gault, 387 U.S. at 30 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562
(1966)). Justice Harlan (concurring in part, dissenting in part) outlined three criteria
by which the procedural requirements of due process should be measured.
(F]irst, no more restrictions should be imposed than are imperative to
assure the proceedings' fundamental fairness; second, the restrictions which
are imposed should be those which preserve, so far as possible, the
essential elements of the State's purpose; and finally, restrictions should
be chosen which will later permit the orderly selection of any additional
protections which may ultimately prove necessary. In this way, the Court
may guarantee the fundamental fairness of the proceeding, and yet permit
the State to continue development of an effective response to the problems
of juvenile crime.
Id. at 72.
119. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
120. The Constitution does not explicitly mention a right to privacy. Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (1973)). However, the Court has recognized that one aspect of liberty
which is protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is a
right of personal privacy, which guarantees certain zones of privacy into which
the government may not intrude. Id. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (right to privacy protects the decision to have an abortion); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to privacy includes unmarrieds' decision to use
contraceptives); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) ("[plrivate possession of
obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime."); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy includes rights of married couples to use
contraceptives.); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 886-90 (1972) (discussion
of right to privacy).
121. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1977)
(minor entitled to use contraceptives without state intrusion because this right is
protected by privacy rights of minors); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (Missouri statute which required written consent of parent
before unmarried woman under age of eighteen could obtain abortion -unconsti-
tutional). For a discussion of the state of the law in this area before the Carey
and Planned Parenthood decisions, see generally Note, A Minor's Right to Con-
traceptives, 7 U.C.D. L. REV. 270 (1974).
122. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. "Constitutional rights do not mature and come
into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors,
as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights." Id.
123. Id. at 75. However, the right can be restricted by the state. The state can
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an abortion and to purchase and use contraceptive devices.' 24
However, as with all challenged state restrictions which infringe on
a constitutional right, if a significant state interest can be found
which supersedes the juvenile's privacy interest, the constitutional
right will be pre-empted by that interest.'25
However, the Supreme Court also has recognized that minors are
particulary vulnerable in some areas and has upheld state laws which
have limited the rights of minors in these areas. In Ginsberg v. New
York, 6 the Court decided that the inability of children to make mature
choices superseded minors' first amendment rights to purchase porno-
graphic magazines.' 17 The Court concluded that the New York State Leg-
islature could determine that the material in question presented a danger
to children against which they should be protected despite the fact it could
not have restricted the sale of the same materials to adults. 28 In Prince
require a pregnant minor to show either: (1) that she is mature enough and has
enough knowledge to make her abortion decision in consultation with her physician,
without parental consent or, (2) that even if she does not have the requisite maturity
or knowledge, the abortion would be in her best interests. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at
643-44.
124. Carey, 431 U.S. at 694.
125. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("[w]here cer-
tain 'fundamental rights' are invoked the Court has held that regulation limiting
these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' . . . and that
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interest at stake"); see also Carey, 431 U.S. at 688; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 463-64 (1972) (White, J., concurring); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965).
126. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
127. Id. at 638. The defendant-petitioner had been convicted for selling sexually
oriented magazines to a minor under the age of seventeen in violation of a New
York statute. It was conceded that the conviction would have been reversed if
based upon the sale of the same material to an adult because of first amendment
protections. Id. at 634. For cases in which the rights of children have been limited
under the Ginsberg rationale, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 741, 749-65 (1982)
(New York statute which prohibited persons from knowingly promoting sexual
performance by child under age sixteen by distributing material which depicts such
performance upheld); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409 (1981) (statute requiring
parental notice of abortion by minor does not violate constitutional rights of that
minor); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (court allows
federal restrictions on broadcasted materials because of ease in which children may
gain access to them); M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281, 1285-86 (10th
Cir. 1983) (upholds city ordinance which prohibited promotion of sexually oriented
material to minors even though such material could be sold to adults).
128. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 637. In Ginsberg, the Court reasoned that the New
York legislature could rationally conclude that the material prohibited by the statute
could impair the ethical and moral development of children. Id. at 641. The Court
also noted that prohibiting the sale of such material to minors did not bar parents
from purchasing the magazines for their children. Id. at 639. In his dissent, Justice
Douglas concluded that obscenity is not excluded from the first amendment. Id.
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v. Massachusetts,'29 an adult was convicted for violating a child labor
statute by allowing a minor to sell religious literature even though
the child had asked to engage in this activity. 3' In upholding the
conviction and rejecting the adult petitioner's first amendment defense,
the Court stated that the interest of society in protecting the welfare
of children and safeguarding them from abuse' 3 ' permitted the state
to enforce the statute even though it would be invalid if made applicable
to adults.' 32
These cases illustrate the paradox of imposing the death penalty
on juveniles. While judicial decisions have expanded the constitutional
rights of minors in the privacy and criminal procedure areas, the
Supreme Court still acknowledges the need to restrict certain con-
stitutional rights of juveniles and to maintain a separate juvenile
justice system.
IV. Statutory Analysis
The Model Penal Code (Code) accepted the constitutional pro-
tection category when it examined the validity of juvenile capital
punishment and expressly rejected imposing the death penalty on
minors under the age of eighteen regardless of the crime.'33 The
Code drafters believed that "civilized societies will not tolerate the
spectacle of execution of children."' 3 4 It was recognized, however,
at 653. Therefore, he reasoned that it was improper for New York to prohibit the
sale of pornography to a minor. Id. at 655
129. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
130. Id. at 162, 170. Petitioner challenged the statute as a restraint on the minor's
freedom of religion. Id. at 164. In rejecting this claim, the Court noted that religious
training may be accomplished in many ways, such as parental religious training
and training through the church. Id. at 171.
131. Id. at 165. "It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community,
that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth
into free and independent well-developed men and citizens." Id. For other cases
in which the Supreme Court balanced first amendment rights against the welfare
of juveniles or adults, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969); Redrup
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195
(1964); Beard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949).
132. Prince, 321 U.S. at 167.
133. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.6(1)(d) (1980) [hereinafter
referred to as M.P.C.J. The M.P.C. provides that when a defendant is found guilty
of murder and the defendant was under eighteen years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime, the court shall impose sentence for a felony of the first
degree as opposed to capital punishment. Id.
134. Id. at 133. This belief was strengthened by the observation that the drafters
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that some juveniles had the mental and physical capabilities to pose
a danger to society, and, therefore, the drafters debated lowering
the maximum age of juveniles protected from capital punishment
to fourteen."' This proposal was rejected based on the belief that
the death penalty should be reserved for adults. 36
The Code's criteria for determining the propriety of a juvenile
death penalty were published originally by the American Law Institute
in 1959.137 Since that time, several states have considered the Code's
provision. Presently, eight states have enacted death penalty statutes
which prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders.' 38 Seven of these
states prohibit capital punishment if the defendant is under age
eighteen.3 9 Nevada will not impose capital punishment if the de-
fendant is under sixteen. 40
One significant difference among the statutes is in the procedural
form that the prohibitions against juvenile capital punishment take.
The two basic approaches used by the states are outright prohibition,
of the Code had the opportunity to make the offender's age only a mitigating
factor but decided to include it as an absolute prohibition as well as a mitigating
factor for those over eighteen. Id. § 210.6(4)(h).
135. Id. at 133. The facts of this debate are not included in the commentaries.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 133-34.
138. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. §
16-11-103(5)(a) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(f)(1) (Supp. 1984); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.025 (1979); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-18-14(A) (Supp. 1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (Page
1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(d) (Vernon Supp. 1985). Kentucky had also
passed a statute which, had it come into effect, would have prohibited the imposition
of the death penalty on juvenile convicts. Ky. REV. STAT. § 208F.040 (1982).
However, the statute, which was to become effective July 15, 1984, was repealed
July 13, 1984. Ky. REV. STAT. § 208F.040 (Supp. 1984). The Maryland State Senate
recently defeated an effort to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on
minors. The Senate voted 26 to 21 against repealing the section of their death
penalty which permits such executions. See The Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1985, at
A18, col. 1 (editorial).
139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-
103(5)(a) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-46A(f)(1) (Supp. 1983); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(B) (Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14(A) (Supp. 1978);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN'. § 2929.03(D)(1) (Page 1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
8.07(d) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
140. NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.025 (1979). It is interesting to note that under
Nevada law a juvenile becomes an adult when he reachs age eighteen. NEV. REV.
STAT. § 129.010 (1979). The statute provides that "[aill persons of age eighteen
years who are under no legal disability, shall be capable of entering into any
contract, and shall be, to all intents and purposes, held and considered of lawful
age." Id. No explanation could be found as to the reason for the the discrepancy
between the two statutes, but this demonstrates the state's conclusion that juveniles
warrant special state protection in the area of criminal sentencing.
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and consideration of the defendant's minority as an absolute mit-
igating factor.' 4' For example, the California statute provides that
the death penalty shall not be imposed on any person who is under
age eighteen at the time of the crime.142 However, the Connecticut
statute provides that,
[t]he court shall not impose the sentence of death on the
defendant if the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds
by special verdict, as provided in subsection (d), that any
mitigating factor exists. The mitigating factors to be con-
sidered concerning the defendant shall include, but are not
limited to, the following: [t]hat at the time of the offense
(1.) he was under the age of eighteen .... 143
While this difference in approaches may seem to be significant, the
effect is the same. In each instance, the age of the defendant will
prohibit imposition of the death penalty.
The statutes do share some common characteristics. All eight statutes
are identical in that the minor's age at the time of the offense is
the relevant consideration rather than his age at the time of arrest.'"
For example, one could conceivably commit a murder while still a
juvenile yet not be arrested until three years later. In this situation,
the state statute would apply and the death penalty would not be
imposed. The statutes are also identical in providing that the max-
imum permissible alternative penalty is life imprisonment.'4 5
Thirteen other states which have death penalties specifically men-
tion the age of the defendant as a potential mitigating factor. 46
141. See supra note 138.
142. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 190.5 (West Supp. 1984).
143. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-46A(f)(I) (West Supp. 1984).
144. See supra note 138.
145. Id. It is recognized that the sentences of life imprisonment with or without
parole have been challenged as being, respectively, ineffective or unconstitutional,
but such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of life
imprisonment in terms of cruel and unusual punishment, see generally Note, Rummel
v. Estelle: Can Non-Capital Punishment Still Be Cruel and Unusual?, 38 WASH.
AND LEE L. REV. 243 (1981). New York does not have an active death penalty,
but is presently considering legislation which would permit judges to sentence
murderers to life imprisonment without parole. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at
B2, col. 1.
146. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(7) (1981); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(5)
(1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-617 (Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6)(g) (West
1984); MD. CRIM. LAW § 413(G)(5) (1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(D) (1979);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.5 II(b)(5) (Supp. 1983); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:11-
3(5)(C) (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(F)(7) (1983); PA. CONS. STAT. §
9711(E)(4) (Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(7) (Supp. 1983); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(E) (Supp. 1983); Wvo. STAT. § 6-2-102(j)(vii) (1977).
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These states allow the jury to decide whether the defendant's youth
is a sufficiently significant factor to commute the death penalty to
life imprisonment. However, they do not specify how old the defen-
dant must be for his age to be considered as a mitigating factor nor
do they suggest that a lower age must lead to greater mitigation; they
simply state that the youth of the defendant may be considered in
determining the length of his sentence. '
In keeping with the requirements enunciated in Lockett, the other
seventeen death penalty states must allow for consideration of any
factor that the jury deems relevant to mitigation" 8 thus permitting
the sentencer to consider the defendant's age in mitigation if it deems
it relevant. Lastly, there are states which prohibit the imposition of
the death penalty under any circumstances. These states obviously
accept the belief that states should not impose the death penalty on
juveniles.
IV. Case Law Analysis
The age of the defendant has been considered by numerous ap-
pellate courts in reviewing the propriety of an imposed death penalty.
This section will examine the reasoning of those appellate courts.
A. Pre-Eddings
1. Death Penalty Not Imposed on Juvenile
It is difficult to categorize decisions which have commuted death
sentences imposed upon juveniles since the reasons for the rejection
of a death sentence and sentence reduction are varied. Some courts,
however, have relied expressly on the defendant's age as a ground
for sentence reduction.' 49 While no state court has determined that
a statute which allows the imposition of a death sentence on a
juvenile is unconstitutional per se, at least one state court has ruled
that imposition of the death penalty on a juvenile defendant is
impermissible. 5 0
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(4) (1979); GA. CODE ANN. §
17-10-30 (1984); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (1984);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1983);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1 (1984).
149. See infra notes 151-69.
150. See infra notes 151-59.
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In Ridge v. State, 1 ' the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma
reduced a death sentence imposed on a fourteen-year-old boy to life
imprisonment. 52  The defendant, a black youth, had been found
guilty of beating and murdering the wife of a prominent farmer in
the area. 53 The state court held that- even though the murder was
deliberately planned and executed and the boy was aware that the
act was wrong, the death penalty was an inappropriate sentence. 54
The Ridge court showed concern for the interaction of the policy
of deterrence in criminal sentencing and the policy of rehabilitation
underlying juvenile statutes.' While the court recognized that max-
imum punishment for crime was the only method that had proven
effective as a deterrent, it noted that juvenile criminal responsibility
had been modified substantially by statute.' 6 The court reasoned
that a fourteen-year-old boy did not have the discretion or sense
of responsibility that an adult possessed and, therefore, should be
punished differently. 57 The court concluded, as a matter of law,
that the jury had abused its discretion in imposing the death penalty
on this defendant. 5 8
The Ridge court effectively proscribed imposition of the death
penalty on a juvenile. In reasoning that the jury abused its discretion,
the court stated that the case should have been assessed without
any sentimental considerations and only in terms of policy. ' 9 The
court must have concluded that imposing capital punishment on a
juvenile would not support the theories of deterrence or retribution.
151. 28 Oki. Crim. 150, 229 P. 649 (1924).
152. Id. at 156, 229 P. at 651.
153. Id. at 151, 229 P. at 649. The defendant lived near the farmer's home.
He was employed to do odd jobs in and -about the home and was, therefore,
familiar with the surroundings. On the day of the murder, the defendant entered
the home on the pretext of inquiring about a horse bridle. He thereafter commenced
a twenty-minute assault upon the deceased. Id. The reason for the assault was
never stated by the court.
154. Id. at 156, 229 P. at 651. The court did conclude that "for the safety of
society" the defendant should be imprisoned for life. Id.
155. Id. at 153-55, 229 P. at 650.
156. Id.; see also supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
157. 28 Oki. Crim. at 155, 229 P. at 650. The court noted that had the defendant
been an adult the court would have affirmed the death penalty. Id. However, in
this instance, the court gave great weight to the policy considerations against imposing
the death penalty against juvenile offenders. Id.
158. Id.
159. 28 Oki. Crim. at 155, 229 P. at 651. ("[ult is a hard problem to solve,
but, after a most careful consideration in all of its aspects, we think that, as a
matter of law, stripped of all sentimental considerations, the jury abused its discretion
in assessing the death penalty.
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In State v. Stewart,160 the Supreme Court of Nebraska reduced
the death sentence of a sixteen-year-old boy to life imprisonment.' 6'
The murder victim had been meeting with the defendant to consumate
a narcotics sale at the time of the murder. 62 While attempting to
steal the drugs from the victim, the defendant fatally shot the drug
seller. 63 The defendant was convicted in state district court of first
degree murder and sentenced to death1 64 The trial judge decided
that the age of the defendant was not a mitigating circumstance'65
concluding that the defendant's youth could not excuse his "heartless
diabolical conduct." 1 6 6
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, however, reasoned that the issue
was not whether the defendant's age "excused" the murder 167 but
whether it should be considered in sentencing. 68 The court concluded
that a sixteen-year-old should receive the benefit of consideration
of mitigating factors including age and commuted the death sentence
to life imprisonment. 69
The issue whether a defendant's age should prohibit the imposition
of capital punishment isolated in Stewart and Ridge must be examined
by other courts. The issue that must be decided is not whether the
minor defendant's age "excuses" the murder but whether the de-
fendant's inexperience and lack of knowledge due to his age pros-
cribes the use of capital punishment.
2. Validity of Juvenile Death Penalty Upheld
The issue whether the eighth amendment prohibits imposing capital
punishment on children has been considered by two state courts,
160. 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977).
161. Id. at 527-28, 250 N.W.2d at 866-67.
162. Id. at 501-03, 250 N.W.2d at 854. The defendant was to pay the victim-
supplier a specified price for the marijuana he sold and retain any money he made
when he resold the drugs.
163. Id. at 501-03, 250 N.W.2d at 855. The defendant shot the decedent and
an associate who survived and proceeded to set fire to the van.
164. Id. at 500, 250 N.W.2d at 853.
165. Id. at 517, 250 N.W.2d at 865. The death penalty statute of Nebraska at
that time provided that the age of the defendant at the time of the offense was
a mitigating factor. Id. at 517, 250 N.W.2d at 862.
166. Id. at 524, 250 N.W.2d at 865. The trial court also discussed the growing
tendency of persons under seventeen years of age to commit crimes. See supra
note 8.
167. 197 Neb. at 524, 250 N.W.2d at 865.
168. Id. at 525, 250 N.W.2d at 865.
169. Id. For a case in which a court determined that the age of the defendant,
twenty-one at the time of the capital offense, was a significant and substantial
mitigating factor, see State v. Watson, 129 Ariz. 60, 628 P.2d 943 (1981).
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which determined that the age of the defendant did not prohibit
imposing the death penalty.
In State v. Valencia,170 the Supreme Court of Arizona upheld the
death penalty sentence which had been imposed on a juvenile de-
fendant who had been found guilty of first degree murder. 7' The
youth had shot and killed his victim after hiding in her car in order
to rob her.' At the time of the murder, the defendant was sixteen-
years-old, and at the time of the confession and arrest, he was
seventeen-years-old. 173
In State v. Harris,174 the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the death
penalty sentence imposed on the defendant who had been convicted
of first degree murder. 17 Harris had abducted, raped, robbed, and
murdered his victim. 176 At the time of the murder and his subsequent
arrest, the defendant was seventeen years and nine months old. 177
Both the Harris and the Valencia courts concluded that the eighth
amendment does not prohibit the sentencing of juveniles to death. 7 1
The Harris court further concluded that the death penalty must
apply equally to adults and juveniles tried as adults. 179 The Valencia
court, however, stated that the age of the offender was an important
consideration in sentencing. 180 However, it did not cite any authority
170. 124 Ariz. 139, 602 P.2d 807 (1979).
171. Id. at 141, 602 P.2d at 809. Although the court reasoned that imposing
the death penalty on a minor was valid, the court found other difficulties with
the sentencing procedure. The court remanded the case for resentencing before a
judge other than the one who imposed the death penalty. For a discussion of the
final holding in Valencia, see infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
172. 121 Ariz. 191, 193, 589 P.2d 434, 436 (1979).
173. Id. The defendant had been picked up by police in order for them to
administer a polygraph exam to test the credibility of his alibi. Id. En route to
the police station, the youth confessed to having killed the deceased.
174. 48 Ohio St. 2d 351, 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Harris v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 911 (1978). Harris was remanded for further
proceedings in light of Lockett v. Ohio. For a discussion of Lockett, see supra
notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
175. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 363, 359 N.E.2d at 74. The court concluded that no
mitigating circumstances had been established by a preponderance of the evidence
and, therefore, the death penalty imposed should be affirmed. Id.
176. Id. at 351, 359 N.E.2d at 68. Harris was one of four men who abducted
the deceased and was the only one who shot her.
177. Id. at 353, 359 N.E.2d at 69.
178. Id. at 358-59, 359 N.E.2d at 71; Valencia, 124 Ariz. at 141, 602 P.2d at
809.
179. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 359, 359 N.E.2d at 72.
180. 124 Ariz. at 141, 602 P.2d at 809.
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for concluding that youth may be an absolute prohibition to capital
punishment.''
B. Eddings v. Oklahoma
In Eddings v. Oklahoma,"2 the United States Supreme Court was
confronted with the issue of whether a state criminal court's im-
position of the death penalty on a sixteen-year-old juvenile convicted
of murder constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the eighth and fourteenth amendments." 3 The Court, however, de-
cided the case on the issue 184 of "[w]hether the Court should address
the plain error committed by the trial court when it refused to
consider relevant mitigating evidence in violation of Lockett v. Ohio
''185
Eddings was charged with the murder of a state highway patrol
officer on April 4, 1977.116 Since Eddings was sixteen-years-old at
the time of the crime, the state moved to have him certified to
stand trial as an adult, and the motion was granted and affirmed. 18 7
Subsequently, Eddings entered a plea of nolo contendere to the
charge of first degree murder. 8 After a hearing on aggravating and
181. Id. This conclusion by the court might lead to the inference that the Arizona
court seemed to rely on the fact that Valencia's attorney did not cite any authority
for concluding that youth may be an absolute bar. Id.
182. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 120 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger stated that the
Court took care to clearly limit their consideration to the initial question as to
whether a juvenile death penalty is constitutional by refusing all other questions
in the petition for certiorai. Id.
Chief Justice Burger also discussed the propriety of the Court's actions. He
argued that the Lockett question was never fairly presented to the state court so
as to give it the first opportunity to apply controlling legal principles. Id. at 120
n.l (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The majority also noted the discrepancy, but stated
that the issue was argued in both briefs and, therefore, the Court could properly
decide the issue. Id. at 113-14 n.9.
185. Brief for Petitioner at i, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
186. Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Okla. 1980). The testimony established
that Eddings had stolen his brother's car so that he, his sister and two friends
could run away from their homes in Missouri. At one point, Eddings lost control
of the car, arousing the interest of a highway patrolman. The officer pulled Eddings
off the road. When the officer was six feet away from the car, petitioner shot
him with a sawed-off shot gun. Id. at 1162-63.
187. In re M.E., 584 P.2d 1340 (Okla.), cert. denied sub. nom. Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 436 U.S. 921 (1978). For a discussion of transfer, see supra notes 50-
59 and accompanying text.
188. Eddings, 616 P.2d at 1162. Oklahoma law provides that the legal effect of
a plea of nolo contendere shall be the same as that of a plea of guilty. OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 513 (West Supp. 1984-1985). Therefore, Eddings effectively
was pleading guilty.
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mitigating circumstances, the district court sentenced Eddings to
death. 8 9
At the sentencing hearing, the defense presented evidence of the
defendant's troubled youth in an attempt to mitigate his sentence.' 90
It also attempted to present testimony which indicated that he was
emotionally disturbed at the time of the crime.' 9' Both the trial
judge and the court of criminal appeals concluded that they could
not consider this evidence as a matter of law. 92
The Supreme Court held that the failure of the two state courts
to consider the age and prior family history of Eddings as possible
mitigating factors violated the sentencing mitigation rule it had
enunicated in Lockett. 93 This rule stated that a judge or jury con-
templating imposition of a death sentence could not be precluded
from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of the defendant's
character. 94 The Court remanded the case ordering the state court
to consider all relevant mitigating evidence and to weigh it against
the evidence of the aggravating circumstances. 9
The Court discussed the mitigating factors offered by the defendant
at the state courts and confirmed the importance both of a convicted
juvenile's minority status and family background. The Court stated
that "just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background and mental
and emotional development of a youthful defendant be duly con-
sidered in sentencing."' 96 Thus, although the Court did not rule on
whether the youth's age by itself prohibited imposition of the death
189. 616 P.2d at 1162.
190. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 107. The facts presented included that Eddings' parents
were divorced when he was five-years-old, bis mother may have been an alcoholic
or prostitute, Eddings could no longer be controlled at age fourteen and was sent
to live with his father, and Eddings' father inflicted excessive physical punishment
upon him. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 113. The trial judge stated that "in following the law" he could not
"consider the fact of this young man's violent background." Id. The Supreme
Court interpreted this statement to mean that the trial judge had concluded, as a
matter of law, that he could not consider the evidence. Id. The Court of Criminal
Appeals stated that this evidence was useful in explaining Eddings' behavior, but
that the evidence tended to show that Eddings "knew the difference between right
and wrong at the time he pulled the trigger, and that is the test of criminal
responsibility in this State." Eddings, 616 P.2d at 1170.
193. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117.
194. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); see supra note 94 and accom-
panying text.
195. Id. at 116.
196. Id.
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penalty, it did state, in dictum, that it was a very important factor.
Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion, which was supported
by Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and White, stated that the case
should have been decided on the eighth amendment issue on which
certiorari was granted and that the court should have affirmed Edding's
death sentence.' 97 In essence, the minority opinion concluded that a
juvenile death penalty does not violate the eighth amendment. These
justices also concluded that the state courts must consider what
evidence would mitigate a death sentence.' g9
C. Post-Eddings Decisions
1. Federal Court Affirmance of a Juvenile Death Penalty
After Eddings, a federal court, in Prejean v. Blackburn,'9 9 upheld
a juvenile death penalty reasoning that death was proper retribution
for the severe crime committed regardless of the age of the defen-
dant. The court's failure to consider the character of the juvenile defen-
dant runs contrary to the Supreme Court's emphasis in Gregg on the
importance of societal values and the need to examine mitigating
factors.
In Prejean, a black male was sentenced to death for killing a police
officer when he was seventeen-years-old. 200 The sentence of death
was upheld, and the federal district court found no eighth amendment
violation.20 1 The Prejean court stated that a court must look at the
kind of punishment imposed in relation to the crime in order to
determine if the sentence is just and constitutional. 2 2 Here, the court
applied this proportionality approach and found the death penalty
proper based on the severity of the crime committed by the juvenile
defendant. The court concluded that the eighth amendment generally
197. Id. at 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
198. Id.
199. 570 F. Supp. 985 (W.D. La. 1983).
200. Id. at 988-89. Prejean, a seventeen-year-old black male, was convicted by
a jury of first degree murder for the shooting death of Louisiana state police
officer Donald Cleveland. At the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury found one
aggravating circumstance, namely that the victim of the crime was a peace officer.
After considering any factors that they may have deemed relevant to mitigation,
the jury unanimously recommended capital punishment. Id.
201. Id. at 999. The court stated that Prejean's claim that the death penalty
was unconstitutional when applied to individuals under eighteen was without merit.
Id. The court also pointed out, however, that youth is a mitigating factor when
judges or juries impose the death penalty in Louisiana. Id. at 999 n.19.
202. Id. at 998.
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is not directed at the propriety of the punishment of a particular
person.
20 3
The Prejean court based its proper and proportionate punishment
conclusion on the recent Supreme Court decisions in Solem v. Helm 204
and Powell v. Texas.2 °0 In Solem, the respondent was sentenced
to life imprisonment for issuing a "no account" check for $100.20 6
In Powell, the petitioner was criminally charged and fined for public
intoxication. 20 7 Both courts held that the punishment imposed was
not disproportionate to the crime committed and, therefore, did not
violate the eighth amendment. 28
Both Solem and Powell considered eighth amendment protections
against disproportionate sentences for noncapital crimes. Justice Pow-
ell's majority opinion in Solem noted the distinction between capital
and noncapital cases and stated that the death penalty differs in
kind from all other forms of punishment. 209 He concluded that capital
cases are of limited assistance in assessing possible eighth amendment
violations for sentencing in a noncapital case. 210 Arguably, the con-
trary also should be true: a noncapital criminal case which considers
eighth amendment protections should not be relied on when eval-
uating whether the imposition of the death penalty violates the
Constitution. The Prejean court, in emphasizing the Powell and
Solem analyses to evaluate capital cases and the eighth amendment
implications, misplaced its reliance on noncapital decisions.
This Prejean approach of examining only the proportionality of the
punishment to the crime detracts from the spirit of the Supreme
Court decisions in Furman, Gregg, Woodson, Roberts, and Lockett
to the great detriment of juvenile offenders. 21' For example, Lockett
specifically guarantees that all possible mitigating factors will be
203. Id.
204. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
205. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
206. Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3002. In effect, Solem was writing checks for funds
he did not possess.
207. Powell, 392 U.S. at 517. In Powell, the petitioner was fined fifty dollars.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Powell, a chronic alcoholic, argued that because
the statute penalized public drunkenness it in effect punished him for his status
and not for having committed a criminal act. Therefore, the punishment was cruel
and unusual as defined by the eighth amendment. The Court rejected this argument,
reasoning that Powell was not being punished for being an alcoholic, but rather
was punished for being drunk on a particular occasion. Id. at 532
208. Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3008; Powell, 392 U.S. at 532.
209. Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3009.
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 65-104 and accompanying text.
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examined when a court determines the propriety of a death penalty." 2
In looking only to the crime and the penalty imposed and effectually
ignoring the defendant, the Prejean court circumvented the require-
ments of these previous cases.
2. State Court Affirmance of the Juvenile Death Penalty
Several state courts have concluded that the eighth amendment
does not forbid the use of capital punishment against juveniles. One
state court, relying on the Eddings decision as the basis for its con-
clusion, 23 still reasoned that society's contempory standards of de-
cency have not rejected the capital punishment of juveniles. 21 4
In State v. Battle,25 the defendant was convicted and sentenced
to death for the murder of an eighty-year-old woman. 2 6 Battle was
eighteen at the time of the murder. 217 Because the Missouri age limit
for juvenile jurisdiction was seventeen,2"' Battle could not use the
Eddings argument that the adult sentence should not be imposed.
However, in questioning the propriety of his sentence, the defendant
stressed his age as a ground for sentence reduction. 21 9
In upholding the death sentence, the Missouri State Supreme Court
first determined that the Missouri Legislature could enact a statute
prohibiting the death penalty in cases involving juveniles. However,
absent such a statute, the court was required to apply the state's
death penalty against youthful offenders who met the requirements
of the statute.2"' The Battle court, citing Eddings v. Oklahoma,22'
also stated that "the imposition of the death penalty is not cruel
212. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
213. See infra notes 215-24 and accompanying text.
214. See infra notes 225-39 and accompanying text.
215. 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. 1983).
216. Id. at 488. The defendant lived in an apartment near the victim. The victim
discovered the defendant and a companion while they were ransacking the victim's
apartment. They proceeded to rape and kill the woman. Id. at 489.
217. Id. at 488.
218. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.021(2) (1983) (" '[clhild' means a person under seven-
teen years of age"). Section 211.011 states that "[t]he purpose of this chapter
is to facilitate the care, protection and discipline of children who come within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.011 (1983). Therefore,
a child must be under seventeen years of age to fall within Missouri's juvenile
court jurisdiction. Id.
219. Battle, 661 S.W.2d at 494.
220. Id. at 494 n.7. "Absent such a statute, states are free to apply their death
penalty statutes to young offenders, and even juvenile offenders who stand trial





and unusual punishment per se simply because the defendant is a
minor at the time of the offense." '222
Arguably, the Eddings majority did not intend its decision to be
interpreted to support a decision such as Battle. The Eddings dissent
stated that the Court had not decided the issue of whether a juvenile
death penalty would be constitutional.223 Justice O'Connor, who
joined in the majority opinion but also wrote a separate concurring
opinion, stated that the constitutional issue had not been decided.224
Therefore, a majority of the Court refused to hold that imposing
the death penalty on minors was not cruel and unusual and per se
contrary to the eighth ammendment.
In Trimble v. State,225 the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the
trial court's decision to apply capital punishment to a juvenile found
guilty of first degree murder.2 26 Trimble challenged his sentence
arguing that imposing the death penalty on persons under eighteen
years of age violated the eighth amendment.2 27 The Trimble court
acknowledged that this question was left unanswered in Eddings and
concluded that the eighth amendment did not shield Trimble from
capital punishment .228
The Trimble court followed Gregg's mandate to examine whether
society had rejected capital punishment as a means of punishing
youthful capital offenders. The court noted that the willingness of
some states to impose such a punishment was counterbalanced by
the reluctance of juries to sentence juveniles to death. 229 The court
concluded, however, that society did not reject capital punishment
for juveniles because the most probative evidence of societal standards
222. Id.
223. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 119 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "I, however, do not read the Court's
opinion either as altering this Court's opinions establishing the constitutionality of
the death penalty or as deciding the issue of whether the Constitution permits
imposition of the death penalty on an individual who committed a murder at age
16." Id.
225. 300 Md. 387, 478 A.2d 1143 (1984).
226. Id. at 393, 478 A.2d at 1146.
227. Id. at 416, 478 A.2d at 1158. Trimble maintained that "imposing the death
penalty on persons under eighteen years of age constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the [elighth [a]mendment and [ajrticles 16 and 25 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights." Id. at 416-17, 478 A.2d at 1158.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 422, 478 A.2d at 1161. The court noted that out of aproximately
800 total death row inmates, only seventeen committed their capital offense while
under age eighteen. Id. citing Brief for the Petitioner at 19A (App. E), Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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was that a firm majority of death penalty states permitted the "
imposition of capital punishment on juveniles. 230
The Trimble court acknowledged that its conclusion was incon-
sistent with the view that juveniles "have a very special place in
life which the law should reflect." ' 23' The court reasoned that not
all juveniles were deserving of or susceptible to such benign treat-
ment. 2 2 The court based its decision on the belief that the theories
of deterrence and retribution require that juveniles who commit
certain capital crimes, especially murder, be held fully accountable
as adults. 233 The court also noted that the overtaxed juvenile system
had not been able to handle serious juvenile offenders.23 4
The Trimble court's conclusion was contrary to most of the so-
ciological and statistical evidence that it examined.2 35 Despite its
acknowledged obligation to look to society's values in determining
whether the death penalty should be imposed and noting that most
juries would not impose it and that other countries are reluctant to
apply it,236 the Trimble court upheld the death sentence. 23 7 The court
conceded, however, that imposing a death penalty on children was
contrary to the standard view of the juvenile in society. 28
To distinguish this evidence and justify the juvenile death penalty
sentence the court noted that twenty-nine of the thirty-nine death
penalty states allowed juveniles to be executed and concluded that
this number constituted a "substantial majority. ' 239 What the court
failed to mention was that eleven states would not impose the death
penalty under any circumstances. Arguably, the fact that that twenty-
nine states allow juvenile capital punishment does not create a
"significant" or "substantial majority" which could provide the sole
230. Id. at 421-22, 478 A.2d at 1160-61. The court did a national search of
state statutes and determined in 1984 that twenty-nine out of the thirty-nine states
which provided for capital punishment permitted the execution of juveniles. Id.
The court determined that this was a substantial majority. Id.
231. Id. at 423, 478 A.2d at 1161, citing May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536
(1953). For a discussion of juvenile rights, see supra notes 105-32 and accompanying
text.
232. 300 Md. at 424, 478 A.2d at 1161.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 422-23, 478 A.2d at 1161.
236. See supra note 2.
237. 300 Md. at 423, 478 A.2d at 1161. "Based on this evidence, we are unable
to conclude that society's contemporary standards of decency have rejected capital
punishment of juveniles." Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 421, 478 A.2d at 1160.
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basis for the court to justify its acceptance of this controversial
form of punishment.
3. Cases Where the Death Penalty Was Not Imposed
Only one state court since Eddings has determined that the de-
fendant's youth mandated commuting his death penalty to life im-
prisonment. In State v. Valencia (Valencia 1),240 the defendant was
convicted of murdering a woman. 4' The trial judge had determined
that the defendant's age was the only mitigating factor and that it
was not enough to overcome the aggravating factors of the de-
fendant's two prior convictions. 242 The case, however, was remanded
by the state supreme court so that the aggravation-mitigation hearing
could be held before a judge other than the one who had tried the
defendant. 243 When the hearing judge on remand also concluded that
the defendant's youth was not enough to prohibit imposition of the
death penalty, 244 Valencia challenged the validity of the conclusion. 245
The state supreme court, in State v. Valencia (Valencia Ij),2 "6
reversed in favor of the defendant but refused to hold that imposing
the death penalty on juveniles was constitutionally prohibited.2 47
However, in its discussion of the proper consideration to be accorded
to age by a death penalty sentencer, the Valencia II court came
closer to a determination of the constitutionality of juvenile capital
punishment than any other post-Eddings case. The court concluded,
as had the Eddings Court, 2" that the age of the defendant is a
substantial and relevant factor which must be given great weight. 249
It held that the defendant's age, sixteen-years old at the time of
240. 124 Ariz. 139, 602 P.2d 807 (1979).
241. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
242. 132 Ariz. 248, 249, 645 P.2d 239, 240 (1982). The defendant had been
convicted of offenses in the state of Arizona involving the threat or use of violence
and for which the sentence of life imprisonment was impossible. Id.
243. Id. The trial judge had spoken with the victim's brother concerning the
family's wishes that the defendant receive the death penalty. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. 132 Ariz. 248, 645 P.2d 239 (1982).
247. Id. at 250, 645 P.2d at 241. "And while we do not hold that age alone
will always act to require life imprisonment . . . ." Id.
248. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
249. Valencia, 132 Ariz. at 250-51, 645 P.2d at 241. "Where there is a doubt
whether the death sentence should be imposed, we will resolve that doubt in favor
of a life sentence. In the instant case, the age of the defendant, 16 at the time
of both crimes, is 'sufficiently substantial' to call for life imprisonment instead of
death." Id.
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the murder, was a mitigating factor of sufficient substantiality to
require the commutation of the death sentence in favor of life
imprisonment.25 In so holding, the Valencia court gave great weight
to the defendant's age as a sentence mitigation factor although it
fell short of holding that the eighth amendment prohibits juvenile
capital punishment.
V. Recommendations
By refusing to declare the imposition of the death penalty on
minors violative of the eighth amendment, the Supreme Court has
effectively placed the burden of protecting juveniles from death
sentences on state legislatures. Therefore, to protect minors, the
legislatures, which permit death sentences but do not recognize an
exception for juveniles, must pass amendments prohibiting the use
of capital punishment against a minor defendant. It is suggested that
the following model provision will accomplish this end.
Model Provision-Amendment to Death Penalty
1. The court shall not impose a penalty of death if the defendant
was age eighteen or younger at the time of the commission of the
offense.
2. If the defendant were older than age eighteen at the time of
the offense, then the sentencer must consider in migitation the age
of the defendant.
The choice of the age eighteen creates an arbitrary dividing line
for when a defendant's youth will serve as an absolute prohibition
to capital punishment. However, this age was chosen to provide
consistency with other areas of the law in which an eighteen-year-
old person is deemed to be an adult.2 1' The first section of the
250. Id.
251. For example, one cannot vote unless he has reached age eighteen. U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. This amendment provides that "[the right of citizens
of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of age." Id.
A male can avoid draft registration until he reaches the age of eighteen.. 50
U.S.C.A. § 453(a) (West Supp. 1984). This section provides that any male between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-six must present himself for draft registration. Id.
Lastly, in terms of contract law, an increasing number of states have reduced the
age for contractual capacity to age eighteen. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
CONTRACTS 231 (2d ed. 1977). For other areas where a state can pass restrictions




Model Provision is written as an absolute prohibition so that it
cannot be subject to varying judicial interpretations as are statutes
which require consideration of age as a mitigating factor.
Section two of the Provision is necessary to circumvent the pos-
sibility that a party who has limited knowledge of the ramifications
of his actions will receive the death penalty. This section imposes
a duty on the sentencer to investigate such an occurrence. Finally,
it is important to note that these provisions only prohibit capital
punishment; they do not prescribe a required alternative sentence.
The imposition of life imprisonment or life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole remain viable alternatives.252
VI. Conclusion
A minor who is on trial for a capital crime and possibly facing
a possible death penalty already has been transferred into the adult
criminal justice system. 253 However, the rationale for the existence
of a separate juvenile justice system best illustrates society's opinion
of how juvenile offenders should be treated. Although these minors
are thrust into the adult system by virtue of their crimes, they are
still juveniles by virtue of their ages. 25 4
The early reformers of the juvenile justice system believed that
society's role was not to ascertain whether the child was "guilty"
or "innocent" but to ascertain what could be done to aid him. 255
It was believed that the child was essentially "good" and could be
"saved" with society's aid. 256 Accordingly, the basis of the juvenile
justice system was not punishment but rehabilitation. Executing a
juvenile, therefore, would not satisfy the desire of society to re-
habilitate minors who have committed criminal acts.
Presently, in eight states, a defendant's youth prohibits the im-
252. See supra note 145.
253. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
254. For a discussion of an opposing point of view, see Note, The Death Penalty
for Juveniles-A Constitutional Alternative, 7 J. Juv. L. 53, 66 (1983). This Note
argues that due to a history of anti-social and criminal conduct, some minors
should receive sentences equivalent to those of adults. This sort of reasoning seems
to circumvent the rationale underlying the juvenile justice system, that being that
it is society's obligation to rehabilitate those minors who are prone to criminal
conduct due to their past social history. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying
text.
255. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967); see supra notes 109-13 and accompanying
text.
256. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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position of capital punishment. 257 In thirteen states, a jury must look
to the defendant's youth as a mitigating factor in capital sentencing
decisions.258 The Supreme Court, which has not yet decided whether
the eighth amendment prohibits imposing capital punishment on
juveniles, 259 construed death penalty statutes in recent cases to protect
the constitutional rights of convicts on death row. 260 While a Supreme
Court decision prohibiting juvenile capital punishment based on an
eighth amendment analysis is the surest way to fully protect juveniles
in every state, a secondary alternative is for states which have death
penalty laws to pass amendments prohibiting juvenile capital pun-
ishment.
In the early 1900's, Judge Julian Mack wrote, that "[tihe problem
of the delinquent child, though jurisdictionally comparatively simple,
is in its social significance, of the greatest importance, for upon its
wise solution depends the future of many of the rising generation." '261
Executing youthful offenders will not adequately solve the dilemma
of serious juvenile crime. Society must employ another method to
punish minors who have committed capital offenses. It is only in
this way that the protections of the eighth amendment, the societal
demand for protection of its minors, and the rehabilitative rationale
for juvenile punishment can be fulfilled.
Rona L. Just
257. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 71-100 and accompanying text.
261. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909).
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